Bank risk is not directly observable, so empirical research relies on indirect measures. We evaluate how well Z-score, the widely used accounting-based measure of bank distance to default, can predict bank failure. Using the U.S. commercial bank data from 2004 to 2012, we find that on average Z-score can predict 76% of bank failure, and additional set of other bank-and macro-level variables do not increase this predictability level. Finally, we obtain that the prediction power of Z-score to predict bank default remains stable within the three-year forward window.
Introduction
This paper assesses the validity of Z-score proposed by Boyd and Graham (1986) as a bank risk measure. Z-score has been widely applied as an indicator of bank's distance-to-default in both academic research and practice. It is calculated as the sum of bank's return on assets and equity to assets ratio divided by the standard deviation of return on assets. It is an estimate of the number of standard deviations below the mean that bank's profits would have to fall to make the bank's equity negative. Higher values of Z-score are thus indicative of low probability of insolvency and greater bank stability. The attractiveness of Zscore relies on the fact that it does not require strong assumptions about the distribution of returns on assets (Boyd and Graham, 1986; Hannan and Hanweck, 1988; Strobel, 2011) , which represents an especially interesting advantage from the practitioner's point of view. The popularity of Z-score also originates from its relative simplicity and the capability to compute it using solely accounting information. Contrary to market-based risk measures, which are computable just for listed financial institutions and may raise estimation concerns stemming from the size of available samples, Z-score is applicable when dealing with an extensive number of unlisted as well as listed entities.
Despite the advantages attributable to the Z-score, however, it is not immune from some caveats. First, its reliability depends on the quality of underlying accounting and auditing framework.
Such an issue is more prominent in cross-country studies due to the degree of each country's institutional development. Second, as banks may smooth out accounting data over time, the Z-score may offer an excessively positive assessment of the risk of bank insolvency. Third, by definition, Z-score is highly sensitive to the standard deviation of ROA. 1 In addition, given the tendency of the dominance of equity to assets ratio in calculating bank's Zscore, the magnitude of the differences in Z-scores may not correspond linearly to the differences in bank risk, since the variation of ROA is only a minor part of the calculation in the numerator.
2 Furthermore, as suggested by Huizinga and Laeven (2012) , banks tend to overstate their value of distressed assets and regulatory capital during the U.S. mortgage crisis, and the calculation of Z-score based on the accounts reported by the bankers may thus be biased upward towards a safer ratio. Hence, despite the popularity of Z-score in banking literature as a proxy for distance-to-default given its soundness in theory, how well it perms in forecasting default is still unknown.
1 For example, consider two banks A and B, both with equity ratio being 0.04. Bank A has average ROA being 0.01 and standard deviation of ROA being 0.001, hence the Z-score for Bank A is 50. While Bank B has higher ROA of 0.02, however, its standard deviation of ROA is also significantly higher, with being 0.002. Thus Bank B's Z-score is 30. Although both banks have proportional ROAs (0.01 vs. 0.02) and its standard deviations (0.001 vs. 0.002), Z-score shows that Bank A is twice as safe as Bank B.
2 Our data shown in Table 2 indicates that average equity to assets ratio is 11% while average ROA is only 0.9%. Therefore, unless a bank has consistently considerable loss over time, Z-score is more likely to be dominated by changes in equity to asset ratios than changes in ROA.
In this study, we attempt to answer this question.
Specifically, we examine two research questions. First, we examine whether Z-score is a sufficient statistic to predict bank failure.
Second, we investigate whether the predicting power of bank failures could significantly increase by adding additional bankspecific and macro variables in the forecasting model. We test these empirical questions in the following ways. We incorporate various versions of Z-score into a complementary log-logistic Merton Distance-to-default, a market based bank risk measure.
We find strong empirical evidence to provide affirmative answer for both questions. First, we find that on average, Z-score together with time fixed effects are able to predict bank failures with the accuracy of 76% (based on Type I errors), while adding a set of other bank-specific and macro variables do not increase the predictability accuracy. Besides, the out-of-sample forecasting performance of Z-score shows that the lowest two deciles of Zscore can predict on average 74% of bank failures across the whole sample. We also find that Z-score is a significant determinant factor of Merton DD measure, indicative of high correlation between the two widely used bank risk measures. Finally, we show that the prediction power of Z-score remains stable within the forward three-year window. Beck et al., 2013; Brown and Dinc, 2011; DeYoung and Torna, 2013; Erkens, 2012; Gorton and Metrick, 2012; Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010; Martinez-Miera and Repullo, 2010; Repullo and Suarez, 2013) .
Our paper also complements to Altman's (1968) Z-score based on multiple discriminant analysis (Balcaen and Ooghe, 2006) .
Altman proposes a model of five variables to predict bankruptcy up to "two years prior to distress and that accuracy diminishes 3 In this sense, our study is also related to Jin et al. (2011) who develop six and ten accounting and audit quality variables to predict whether banks failed during the financial crisis starting from 2007. For recent studies on managerial incentives that give rise to earnings smoothing for financial industries, see Cheng et al. (2011) and Eckles et al. (2011) , and for discussions on how regulations could change earnings smoothing incentives for bank managers, see Kilic et al. (2012) .
substantially as the lead time increases" (Altman, 2000) . We organize the remainder of this paper as follows. Section 2 describes the data sample and how we identify failure events.
Section 3 discusses the methodology as well as the variables used in our paper and their descriptive statistics. Section 4 and 5 present empirical results and robustness tests. Section 6 concludes.
Data
We obtain fourth-quarter data from 2003 to 2012 on private and public commercial banks in the U.S. from the Reports on 4 The variables used in his 1968 seminal study are: (1) working capital/total assets, (2) retained earnings/total assets, (3) earnings before interest and taxes/total assets, (4) market value equity/book value of total liabilities, and (5) sales/total assets. Given that the initial model was developed to predict failure of publicly traded listed manufacturing firms, later in Altman (2000), Altman modified his original model to predict failures in private and in publicly traded listed non-manufacturing firms (1984) , known as the "revised" or "alternative" Z-score model. 5 We use yearly data instead of quarterly data to minimize the seasonal effects of bank performance. We define these bank closures as failure. Table 1 [Insert 
where X contains time-varying covariates for each bank at time t-1. Traditional complementary log-log model assumes duration independence, i.e. the probability of surviving or failing at any point in time is always the same. In order to deal with time dependency problems arising when using these models, we use robust standard errors clustered on the unit of analysis and include in the vector X temporal dummy variables for each period or 'spell'.
In addition, the complementary log-log model yields estimates of the impact of the indicators on the conditional probability of failure, which means that we obtain failure probabilities, conditional on surviving to a certain point in time.
In order to examine whether the model is able to correctly identify failed banks, we compute two types of errors: Type I and The analysis based on Type I and II errors is based on the arbitrary decision of the cut-off point. To overcome this problem, we also assess the accuracy of failure forecasts using the empirical distribution of the predicted probabilities of failure generated by complementary log-log model. We assign each observation to a decile of this empirical distribution, and we count how many genuine failure events fall into each decile. The accuracy of the model increases when a high fraction of failure events fall in the deciles associated to high predicted probabilities of failure.
The estimation of Z-score
Despite various shortcomings of Z-score, a number of approaches have been developed for the Z-score's construction, and abundant empirical studies employ Z-score as proxy for bank risk (see, e.g., Boyd and Graham, 1986; De Nicolò, 2000; Stiroh, 2004; Beck and Laeven, 2006; Laeven and Levine, 2009; Beck et al., 2013; Chiaramonte et al., 2013; DeYoung and Torna, 2013; Liu et al., 2013) .
We compute the Z-score following different approaches developed by the literature for its construction (see the variable definition in the Appendix). On the basis of the most common approach (Boyd and Graham, 1986; Hannan and Hanweck, 1988) , the first Z-score used in our analysis (hereafter 'Z-score 1') is calculated as the sum of equity to total assets (ETA) and return on assets (ROA) divided by the three-year standard deviation of ROA (σROA). Following Maecheler et al. (2007), we also compute the Z-score using the three-year moving return of assets (A_ROA) plus the three-year moving average of equity to total assets (A_ETA) over the three-year standard deviation of A_ROA (σ A_ROA ). We label this type of Z-score as 'Z-score 2'. The third way of estimation of the Z-score follows Boyd et al. (2006) and is calculated as the sum of three-year moving average of equity to total assets (A_ETA)
and current values of return on assets (ROA) divided by the threeyear standard deviation of ROA (σROA). We label this type of Z-score as 'Z-score 3'. Finally, following Laeven and Levine (2009) and Dam and Koetter (2012) , we compute the Z-score as the sum of tier 1 ratio (TIER 1 RATIO) and return on risk weighted assets (R_RWA)
divided by the three-year standard deviation of R_RWA (σR_RWA). We label this type of Z-score as 'Z-score 4'. Since the Z-score is usually highly skewed, we use the natural logarithm of the Zscore, which is more likely to follow normal distribution (Laeven and Levine, 2009; Liu et al., 2013) . We label the natural logarithm of Z-score as lnZ.
Variables
We include several bank-and macro-level factors as control variables to capture differences in bank risk profiles that are associated with other bank characteristics, macroeconomic conditions or banking market structures. These different categories of indicators represent various determinants of a bank's vulnerability (see Betz et al., 2014) . In the Appendix, we describe the control variables outlined below and summarize their hypothesized relationships with the probability of bank failure.
The first control variable we consider is the natural logarithm of a bank's total assets as a proxy for bank size (SIZE). Existing literature indicates that the sign linking SIZE to the probability of bank failure could be uncertain. The relationship can be negative when growth of bank size leads to efficiency gains and superior ability of diversification, which would result in higher bank stability. On the other hand, the relationship may become positive when diversification strategies followed by large banks do not make them safer and may exacerbate the risk of a system-wide breakdown (Allen and Jagtiani, 2000) or result in higher earnings volatility while relying on the implicit guarantee associated with the too-big-to-fail argument (DeYoung and Roland, 2001; DeJonghe, 2010, Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010 ).
Next, we include bank diversification (DIV) as another control variable and measure it by the ratio of non-interest income to total operating income following Stiroh (2004). We expect a negative sign between DIV and the probability of bank failure because diversification leads to risk reduction and therefore lower the likelihood of failure.
In addition, we employ the ratio of the sum of cash, available-for-sale securities and federal funds sold to total assets (LIQ) as a proxy for bank liquidity. The relationship linking LIQ to bank failure is expected to be negative. The more liquid the bank is and the less vulnerable to a classic run. An increase in LIQ should therefore correspond to a reduction in probability of bank default. In addition, we include the ratio of non-performing loans to total assets (NPL) as a proxy for asset quality. The higher ratio of NPL indicates the lower quality of the bank loan portfolio. Hence, an increase in NPL should lead to an increase in probability of bank failure. Furthermore, we employthe cost-to-income ratio (CIR) as a proxy for bank operational efficiency. Since low values of CIR indicate better managerial quality, the relationship between CIR and probability of bank failure is expected to be positive.
Finally, within the bank-specific factors, we include the Bank Holding Company (BHC) dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 if the bank is owned by a BHC and 0 otherwise. We expect a negative sign between BHC dummy and bank failure. A bank that is a part of a BHC may be subject to more complex risk management and stricter monitoring because BHCs boards have more committees and meet more frequently than other boards (Adams and Mehran, 2003) .
The increased corporate governance may thus reduce the likelihood of bank failure.
In our empirical analysis, we also consider the most commonly used macroeconomic indicators: the annual percentage change of gross domestic product (GDPC) and the annual inflation rate (INF).
We expected that low GDP growth and high inflation increase bank vulnerability (see Betz et al., 2014) . Hence, we hypothesize a negative sign for GDPC and a positive sign for INF.
To measure the degree of banking system concentration, we determine the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (hereafter HHI). The HHI is calculated as the sum of the squared market share value (in term of total assets) of all banks in the country. The theoretical relationship linking HHI to bank survival is uncertain based on the previous studies. The competition-fragility view expects a positive sign as competitive markets limit the ability of banks to gain informational advantages from their relationships with borrowers, reducing their incentives to properly screen borrowers, thus increasing the risk of default (Allen and Gale, 2000, 2004; Carletti, 2008; Beck et al., 2013 We also observe low values of inflation ratio (INF) and bank concentration (HHI) with low variations throughout the period while the annual GDP growth (GDPC) shows relevant changes.
Summary statistics
Finally, Table 3 presents the correlation matrix for our main variables of interest (the four measures of Z-score), its components and the control variables. It shows that all the four Z-scores we construct are highly correlated with one another as expected.
It also shows that though many of the pairwise correlation coefficients are statistically significant, the correlation magnitudes are in general low.
[Insert Table 2 and 3] and the combination of Z-score and the common bank-and macrolevel control variables. In the final column, we also test the predictive power of control variables without the inclusion of Zscore. We also include time fixed effects in all our regressions.
Main Results

Estimates and Prediction Results
The bottom of Table 4 healthy bank is falsely identified as a failing bank by using the information of Z-score 1 only 6 . In the last column of Table 4 , we report the results by considering alternative set of other bankspecific and macro variables, and find that both Type I error (28.2%) and Type II error (27.9%) are higher than those when Zscore alone is considered, suggesting a better predictability using Z-score alone in comparison to using the set of other bankspecific and macro variables as we defined earlier as independent variables. For each Z-score variable, we also report the results by combining the Z-score and the other bank-specific and macro variables, and we find that the latter leads to slightly higher Type I errors while slightly lower Type II errors. These results suggest that by adding a set of other bank-specific and macro variables to the Z-score does not significantly improve the predictability of our hazard model. We also exclude from the model the time fixed effects to examine the predictive power of Z-score on its own. We find that on average the exclusion of time fixed effects increases the Type 1 error by 10% while the Type 2 error remains unchanged to that reported for the models with time fixed effects.
In Table 4 , we display that the empirical results of the control variables are in general consistent with our expectations.
The positive sign of SIZE implies that larger banks take on higher risk which may endanger their probability of survival. Similarly, more concentrated banking markets result to increase the probability of bank default. Positive relationship is also found between the non-performing ratio (NPL) as a measure of asset quality and the probability of default. This result is consistent with those reported in Poghosyan and Čihák (2011) and Betz et al. Overall, Table 4 indicates that the Z-score, in all its computations, is a key determinant of the probability of bank survival, and the additional contribution of the bank-specific and macro variables to predict bank default is marginal at best.
[Insert Table 4 ]
Default Forecasts
The predictive accuracy of the Z-score relative to the control variables with or without the Z-score is further confirmed by the failure forecasts in Table 5 . Following Bharath and Shumway (2008), we assess the accuracy of our complementary log-log model by sorting banks in deciles based on the predicted probabilities and calculating the percentage of defaults by decile of the sole forecast variable (Z-score), the combination of Z-score and bankspecific and macro variables, and the set of control variables alone. Table 5 shows that the highest percentage of failure is in the tenth and ninth deciles (i.e. banks with the largest probability of failure or lowest value of Z-score) for all the specifications. By adding the other set of bank-specific and macro variables to the Z-score, however it is measured, will increase the predictability power of the tenth decile (for example, 64.31%
vs. 61.59% for Z-score 1). However, the overall predictability of both tenth and ninth deciles remain similar (for example, 73.91% vs. 73.54% for Z-score 1). Both these results with the inclusion of Z-scores report significant higher predictability power than that of control variables only. These results confirm that the Zscore alone is a good predictor of bank failure.
[Insert Table 5 ]
Z-score versus Merton distance-to-default measure
In addition to the examination of the predictability of Z- The results are reported in Table 6 , where we observe that all our Z-score measures are significantly and positively correlated with the DD measure, which indicates that the accounting and market based bank risk measures are consistent with one another. This is the first attempt, to the authors' best knowledge, to examine the consistency of the accounting and market based bank risk measures and it strengthens the results in the previous sections that Zscore is an informative and reliable measure for bank risk.
[Insert Table 6] 7
The SAS commands for estimating the DD model can be found in Bharath and Shumway (2008).
Robustness Tests
In light of the numerous failure events that characterized the U.S. banking industry during the recent years, we investigate the suitability of the Z-score as a measure of bank risk during and after the crisis period of 2007-2012. Table 7 Table 7 highlights that during this period, the Z-score can predict bank failures with an accuracy of 81 percent (see Type I errors). The results for Type II errors also confirm the best predictive power of the Z-score, especially compared to the control variables alone.
8
[Insert Table 7] We further test whether, and to which extent, the single components of the natural logarithm of the Z-score affect the probability of bank failure (see results (1) of Table 8 ).
9 To this aim we re-estimate the complementary log-log model on the whole period (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) , but only for our main variables of interest,
Following Barath and Shumway (2008), we also assess the accuracy of our complementary log-log model for the 2007-09 financial crisis time period in an unreported analysis. Our main results hold. 9 The components of the lnZ are lagged by one year. the Z-scores, given that the contribution of the control variables is only marginal as shown in Table 4 . Results (1) of Tables 8 show   that , regardless of how the Z-score is computed, all the three components significantly affect the bank probability of failure, with the exception of the Tier 1 ratio being insignificant.
Finally, we check whether Z-score has predictive power two or three years before the failure (see results (2) and (3) of Table   8 ). Therefore, we test the complementary log-log model firstly on a two-year lag and then on a three-year lag of the natural logarithm of the Z-score. We find in the results (2) and (3), that lnZ is strongly significant both in two and three years before failure with the expected negative sign. These results indicate that Z-score has the ability to predict bank failure even two to three years before the failure events.
[Insert Table 8 , of its components and of the control variables (bank-specific and macro factors) used in our analysis. We report only the descriptive statistics for the components of the Z-score 1 given that the components of the other different types of Z-score show a similar trend. The estimates are done by bank status and on the full sample, with the sole exception of the macro variables that are observed only with reference to the whole sample. The 'full sample' includes the failed and active banks. The descriptive statistics are referred to the whole period (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) This table shows a comparison of the complementary log-log model results obtained using alternatively the four different Z-score measures (i.e. our main variable of interest) alone and with the control variables. Finally, we also test the complementary log-log model on the control variables only (see last column). Each regressions is tested on the whole period, 2004-2012 (latest data available). The different types of the Z-score and the control variables used in this paper are described in the Appendix. Year dummy variables are also incorporated in the model. The robust standard errors of the estimated coefficients are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote coefficients statistically different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels in two-tailed tests, respectively. This table also displays the relationship between model predictions and actual failure events on the full sample for the whole period (see Panel A) using a cut-off point equals to 0.01. TP stands for 'True Positive'; FN stands for 'False Negative'; FP stands for 'False Positive'; TN stands for 'True Negative'. Type I error occurs when the model fails to identify the failed bank. It is computed as: FN/(FN+TP). Type II error occurs when a healthy bank is falsely identified as failed (i.e. a false alarm). It is computed as: FP/(FP+TN). (1) the components of the natural logarithm of the Z-score (lnZ) and (2) the second lag and (3) the third lag of the Z-score. The different types of Z-score and their components are described in the Appendix. The dependent variable (the defaulted bank dummy variable) that takes the value of 1 if bank i becomes failed at time t (the year in progress) and 0 otherwise. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year. To mitigate the effect of outliers, we winsorize observations in the outside 1 percent of each tail of each variable. Year dummy variables are also incorporated in the model. These findings were obtained using unconsolidated bank statements. The robust standard errors of the estimated coefficients are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote coefficients statistically different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels in two-tailed tests, respectively. This table also displays the relationship between model predictions and actual failure events on the full sample for the whole period, using a cut-off point equals to 0.01. We also tested the regressions using a cut-off point equal to 0.10 rather than 0.01 and we obtained very similar results.TP stands for 'True Positive'; FN stands for 'False Negative'; FP stands for 'False Positive'; TN stands for 'True Negative'. Type I error occurs when the model fails to identify the failed bank and is computed as: FN/(FN+TP). Type II error occurs when a healthy bank is falsely identified as failed (i.e. a false alarm) and is computed as: FP/(FP+TN).
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